Divine discourse: Philosophical reflections on the claim that god speaks.  nicholas wolterstorff, cambridge, ma  cambridge university press, 1995. x + 326 pp. by Himma, Kenneth Einar
Divine Discourse: Philosophical Reflections on the 
Claim that God Speaks. Nicholas Wolterstorff, 
Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 
x + 326 pp. 
Kenneth Einar Himma 
University of Washington 
Regardless of whether one agrees with the content of 
Wolterstorff's Divine Discourse, it is clear that it is a ground-break-
ing and philosophically powerful piece. In this book, based on his 
1993 Wilde Lectures at Oxford, Wolterstorff brings together themes 
from speech act theory, Biblical interpretation, religious epistemol-
ogy, theology and philosophical hermeneutics. At the intersection 
of these fields lies a claim Wolterstorff sees as fundamental to Ju-
daism, Christianity and Islam (p. 8): the claim that God speaks. 
More specifically, the claim that centers Wolterstorff's book is that 
God performs illocutionary acts. Divine Discourse is devoted to a 
defense of this claim. Wolterstorff's defense involves three projects. 
First, he seeks to establish that God, despite lacking a physical 
body, can literally be said to speak; that is, it is logically possible 
for God to speak. Second, he hopes to show that given his analysis 
of what it is to speak, God is in fact the kind of being who can 
speak. Finally, he argues that the claim that God speaks is plau-
sible. As a corollary to these projects, Wolterstorff also provides 
some guidance for interpreting scripture for divine speech. Due to 
the immense number of research areas Wolterstorff brings together, 
to do full justice to his book would require treating it from varied 
perspectives. I do not pretend to be able to do so. Given my own 
interests and background, I will be evaluating Wolterstorff's book 
primarily as a piece of religious epistemology. I hope to be as just 
as possible, though recognizing that there is far more to be said 
than can be said here. 
Due to the non-physical nature of God, it has been widely be-
lieved that God cannot literally speak in the way that you or I can 
(p. 10). God, after all, has no physical organs by which to speak. 
On what I'll call the traditional view, talk of God's speech must be 
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taken metaphorically. The end result of the traditional view is that 
divine speech becomes subsumed under divine revelation (pp. 9-
10). This, Wolterstorff notes, is why the topic of divine speech, 
despite its fundamental role in western theism, has received such 
little attention. On the traditional view, God "speaks" to us through 
revelatory acts. These revelatory acts can be of many different types: 
scripture, history, personal religious experiences, etc. But God does 
not speak in any literal sense in these acts. Such acts (at least the 
latter two) are probably just as much showings as they are sayings, 
if not more so. Wolterstorff argues that recent developments in 
speech act theory can provide us with an intelligible, and ultimately 
preferable alternative to the traditional view. God can indeed liter-
ally speak. 
It is in this critique of the traditional view that Wolterstorff's 
first project lies. Wolterstorff takes up Austin's distinction between 
locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts. Wolterstorff 
notes that the three are logically separable (p. 13). What this means 
for divine discourse is that it is logically possible for illocutionary 
acts to be performed without any locutionary act; thus it is logi-
cally possible for God to literally speak even though God lacks a 
physical body. Half of the traditional view has been quickly dis-
mantled. Wolterstorff could be content to rest on his laurels, hav-
ing established that God can literally speak, but he is unhappy with 
the rest of the traditional view as well. Wolterstorff sees as objec-
tionable the reduction of divine speech to divine revelation. Once 
we treat divine speech as an illocutionary act, this reduction is 
blocked. Wolterstorff, following Swinburne, claims that revelation 
involves a dispelling of ignorance concerning something that is 
hidden (p. 23). As an example, consider the homosexual who de-
cides to "out" him/herself. A feature of this person which was once 
hidden from us, of which we were previously ignorant, has been 
disclosed. Revelation, as described, involves a transmission of 
knowledge. The outed homosexual has provided us with knowl-
edge about this specific aspect of his/her person. We should be-
ware, however, of overly anthropomorphizing revelation. An item 
of knowledge can be hidden and then revealed without its being 
hidden or revealed intentionally. The background radiation from 
the Big Bang was hidden for millennia without its being intention-
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ally hidden by any agent, and its discovery came about largely by 
accident. However, since we are interested in divine revelation, we 
can treat revelation as intentional. In our context, divine revelation 
is God's intentional transmission to us of some piece of knowl-
edge which was once hidden, something of which we were previ-
ously ignorant. Wolterstorff distinguishes between Manifestational 
and non-Manifestational (or Propositional) revelation (p. 28). 
Manifestational revelation involves a natural sign for what is re-
vealed. To use Wolterstorff's example, a husband's snapping at his 
wife is a natural sign of anxiety. Propositional revelation involves 
non-natural signs, primarily linguistic signs, and involves some-
one (the revealer, the one revealed to, or both) having proposi-
tional knowledge. If divine speech is a form of revelation, surely it 
is a form of Propositional revelation. But can we carry out this 
reduction? Wolterstorff thinks not. His reason is straight-forward 
and (at least so it seems to me) obvious: revelation is knowledge-
transferring, though not all illocutionary acts transmit knowledge 
(p. 32). More specifically, while revelation transmits knowledge 
concerning what is revealed, illocutionary acts do not necessarily 
transmit knowledge of what is illocuted (my apologies for the ugly 
term). The outed homosexual's revelation transmits knowledge 
about what s/he reveals: his/her homosexuality. But consider now 
one of Austin's favorite illocutionary acts, my promising to meet 
you tomorrow. My promising may be said to reveal something, but 
what it reveals is something like my intentions, not my promising 
itself. The same goes for commands. My requesting that you shut 
the door may reveal something about my desires, but it does not 
reveal my request itself. Commands and promises may be revela-
tory, but what they reveal are not commands and promises (p. 35). 
Thus, at least some divine speech (and I suspect those speech acts 
which are of the most importance to us) cannot be reduced to di-
vine revelation. 
Wolterstorff's second project is to show that God is in fact the 
kind of being who can be said to speak. The first step in accom-
plishing this is to provide an account of illocutionary acts. On 
Aust in 's account of illocutionary actions, what makes an 
illocutionary act what it is is convention. It is because certain con-
ventions have been established and are accepted that my uttering 
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the words "I will" under certain circumstances constitutes the act 
of marrying. To put it in another way, illocutionary acts are what 
they are because of established institutions, both social and lin-
guistic. Wolterstorff does not find Austin's account complete: 
One reason this will not do—it's a point which 
has been made by several writers—is that often 
our speaking just doesn't follow the linguistic 
rules.... Yet we really do say something—do re-
ally perform the speech act. As when I request 
someone to pass the salt with the sentence, "Could 
you pass the salt?" The response of the whipper-
snapper teen-ager who replies, "Yes, I suppose I 
could" and then does nothing, highlights the dif-
ference between what was asked and what the rules 
of the language would tell us was asked, (p. 79) 
We sometimes really do perform illocutionary actions even though 
we violate established rules or conventions. Wolterstorff also re-
jects Austin's account on the grounds that we do in fact have an 
institution-independent conception of some illocutionary acts: 
... though on first glance it seems promising to un-
derstand asserting, commanding, and similar, as 
institutional facts, rather like hitting a home run 
and committing a balk, the promise proves illu-
sory. For whereas the action of hitting a home run 
is constituted by a particular set of rules, surely an 
action like assertion is not so constituted. There 
are many different ways of asserting; there could 
be more. If, in a given situation, we are for one or 
another reason dissatisfied with the standard ways 
available to us of asserting something, we can de-
vise a new way. We have a concept of assertion 
which is, in that way, rule-independent, (p. 81) 
If I may expand Wolterstorff's criticism a bit, it seems to me that 
the problem is that we have to have an institution-independent con-
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ception of some illocutionary acts in order to be able to establish 
or revise our institutions and conventions. 
Now if convention isn't the answer, what exactly is? 
Wolterstorff's answer is that what makes an illocutionary act what 
it is is that it takes up a specific normative standing (pp. 82-5). 
Illocutionary acts have attached to them normative requirements. 
My promising to meet you tomorrow comes with a prima facie 
obligation to do so. We are morally responsible for our illocutionary 
acts; to perform an illocutionary act is to embroil oneself in a nor-
mative endeavor. 
This has consequences for the requirements a being must meet 
to be a speaker. Since to perform an illocutionary act is to adopt a 
certain normative position, only a being which is a moral agent 
can be a speaker. Beings which are not moral agents can perform 
Iocutionary acts (and perhaps perlocutionary acts as well), but they 
cannot perform illocutionary acts. God must be a moral agent, a 
person (p. 95). At this point Wolterstorff embarks on a path he is 
best served, I think, by not taking. He spends a good deal of time 
discussing the divine command theory. Wolterstorff likes the di-
vine command theory because it requires that God be part of a 
community of speakers (pp. 99-100). But, paradoxically, the di-
vine command theory rules out the possibility of God being able to 
speak because traditionally the divine command theory claims that 
God's commands do not apply to Godself (pp. 99-100). Since God's 
commands are what determine right and wrong, and God's com-
mands are not applicable to Godself, nothing determines right and 
wrong for God. God is not in the position of being a moral agent— 
God cannot adopt a normative position. Thus, on the divine com-
mand theory, God cannot perform illocutionary acts. Wolterstorff, 
however, quite rightly notes that there is no good reason for the 
divine command theory to saddle itself with the claims that God's 
commands don't apply to Godself (p. 107). Many supporters of 
the divine command theory (most notably William of Ockham) 
have claimed that this independence is necessary for God to be 
truly sovereign, but no good arguments have been advanced for 
this position, and there is no good philosophical or theological rea-
son to hold it. Thus, we can jettison such a claim, leaving us with a 
purged version of the divine command theory which will require 
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that God be part of a community of speakers and allows for God to 
be so. But such a roundabout way is unnecessary, and accomplishes 
little save to inform us of what moral theory Wolterstorff accepts 
(especially since he doesn't argue for the divine command theory 
here). All he really needs to claim to place God among the commu-
nity of speakers is that (1) in order for any being to qualify as God 
it must be morally perfect, and (2) moral perfection requires being 
a moral agent. If both of these are true, then God can take up the 
normative position required by illocutionary acts. (2), I take it, is 
uncontroversial and almost surely analytically true if anything is. 
Thus, Wolterstorff would need to defend only claim ( 1). Such a 
claim, I think, could be defended on the grounds that 'God' serves 
as a title denoting a being which is worthy of total devotion, and 
only a morally perfect being could be worthy of such—though moral 
perfection is surely not sufficient to qualify as God, it is, I think, 
necessary. Following this route allows Wolterstorff to avoid in-
voking a moral theory which is widely considered false, which 
would make his case more convincing. 
Wolterstorff then takes up the issue of whether it is possible 
for God to cause those events which are generative of discourse. 
There is a relatively straightforward way to argue that the answer 
to this question is 'yes' . God, being the creator, created the world 
in such a way that divine speech is built into the fabric of the world 
from the very beginning. That is to say, at creation God already 
knows when God will speak, what God will say, etc. Divine dis-
course is, so to speak, accomplished at the moment of creation. 
But Wolterstorff is not satisfied by such a defense. This defense, 
he points out, assumes that there are true counterfactuals of free-
dom. Wolterstorff himself does not believe that there are, though 
not wishing to bog his readers down with the debate over this (a 
wise choice), he does not argue for this claim. If Wolterstorff is 
correct, and there are no true counterfactuals of freedom, then God 
cannot impose divine discourse on the world at creation; God must 
intervene in worldly affairs to speak (pp. 122-3). The question then 
becomes whether God can causally intervene in worldly affairs. 
The prominent reason for thinking that God cannot is the alleged 
causal closure of the physical world. Physics, so the argument goes, 
presupposes that the world is causally closed—no external influ-
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ence can exert itself on the physical world. But does contemporary 
physics, or any other science for that matter, really require this? 
Wolterstorff is skeptical. Natural laws, he points out, are always 
ceteris paribus laws (p. 125). No natural law rules out the possibil-
ity of an outside influence, a case where ceteris is not paribus. 
Since this is the case, we cannot rule out the possibility that the 
world is causally open. Thus, God's intervention does not violate 
any natural law (p. 126). God's intervening in worldly affairs to 
speak is scientifically and philosophically acceptable. Wolterstorff's 
argument, though powerful, is not entirely convincing. Certainly 
individual natural laws are ceteris paribus, but this won't resolve 
the issue at hand. What strikes me as being the crux of the issue is 
whether the entire system of natural laws is ceteris paribus; that is, 
whether all causal influence must come from within the physical 
world. The mere fact that natural laws are ceteris paribus does not 
automatically permit God to have a causal influence; the physical 
world can still be causally closed. Thus, Wolterstorff has not en-
tirely succeeded in defending the claim that God can cause the 
events constitutive of speech acts. 
Wolterstorff's third project is to make plausible the claim that 
God can speak. It is worth noting here that Wolterstorff is involved 
largely in internecine warfare. He works from the assumption that 
God exists; it is not until almost the end of the book that he takes 
any effort to make plausible to the non-believer that God speaks. 
In most of the book, he is concerned with providing fellow believ-
ers with an intelligible account of how it is that God speaks. God 
speaks through what is called 'double agency'. Double agency is 
discourse through words not uttered or written by oneself (p. 38). 
We can think of this as an illocutionary act performed through the 
Iocutionary act of someone else. While the idea of double agency 
looks odd at first, reflection shows that it is actually fairly com-
monplace. A song dedicated to one's beloved is an act of double 
agency; / say something to my beloved through the medium of 
someone else's musical performance. One can also see double 
agency in the literary example of Cyrano. Examples abound in the 
political arena; political leaders often speak through their repre-
sentatives. Wolterstorff identifies two modes by which double 
agency occurs: deputization and appropriation (pp. 41 , 52). 
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Deputizing occurs when one person is, in certain specified cir-
cumstances, authorized to speak for another. Madeline Albright, 
for example, is authorized to speak for President Clinton. Through 
Albright's speech, it is Clinton who demands of Saddam Hussein 
that he comply with U.N. weapons inspectors. Consider also a 
secretary's typed memo to the office: it is through the secretary's 
memo that the boss speaks; the secretary has been authorized to 
deliver memos on the boss's behalf. We can also put this by saying 
that Albright speaks in the name of President Clinton, the secretary 
in the name of the boss. We can see religiously significant ex-
amples in the Old Testament's prophetic writings (p. 45). Proph-
ets, like oracles of old, are said to speak in the name of God. When 
Moses delivered the Decalogue to the Israelites, it was God who 
was making commands. (Consider, for example, the First Com-
mandment, which begins "I am the Lord thy God...". How else are 
we to make sense of this except as Moses delivering a command-
ment in the name of God; that is, God's commanding through 
Moses?) 
Appropriation occurs when one agrees with the discourse of 
another. Seconding a parliamentary motion, for example, is a case 
of appropriating discourse. It is to accept as true the discourse of 
another. This need not, however, involve agreement on all ele-
ments—rather, agreement need only be on the essentials, the main 
point or message. Thus, one who seconds or co-sponsors a motion 
need not agree with everything put forward in the resolution nor 
approve of the exact wording of it; friendly amendments are pos-
sible. This, Wolterstorff argues, is all that is needed for scriptural 
authority— scripture is appropriated in its essence by God (p. 54). 
Wolterstorff prefers the appropriative model of divine discourse 
to the deputizing model (p. 186; though note that he does not en-
tirely reject the deputizing model—p. 187). While the western the-
istic traditions are rich in prophetic tradition, deputizing has atten-
dant ambiguities (cf. pp. 46-7). It is not always clear which speech 
by the deputized is done in the name of the deputizer. We can see 
this in the many Biblical passages which seem to move back and 
forth between deputized and one's own discourse. Wolterstorff pro-
vides the following example from Hos.9:11-17 (quoted from p. 
46): 
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Ephraim's glory shall fly away like a bird— 
no birth, no pregnancy, no conception! 
Even if they bring up children, 
I will bereave them until no one is left. 
Woe to them indeed when I depart from them!... 
Give them, O Lord— 
what will you give? 
Give them a miscarrying womb and dry breasts. 
Every evil of theirs began at Gilgal; 
there I came to hate them. 
Because of the wickedness of their deeds 
I will drive them out of my house. 
I will love them no more; 
all their officials are rebels. 
Ephraim is striker, 
their root is dried up, 
they shall bear no fruit. 
Even though they give birth, 
I will kill the cherished offspring of their womb. 
Because they have not listened to him, 
my God will reject them... 
Some parts of this are clearly Hosea's voice alone: "Because they 
have not listened to him, my God will reject them". Others, like "I 
will bereave them until no one is left" is clearly meant to be God 
speaking. But other parts are ambiguous. In whose voice should 
we hear "Ephraim is striker, their root is dried up, they shall bear 
no fruit"? These problems don't arise for the appropriation model. 
God appropriates the main message of the passage. God cannot in 
this case appropriate the letter of the passage; for it contains much 
that could not rightly be attributed to God, such as God's hating 
the Ephraimites. But God can appropriate the essence of the pas-
sage: the Ephraimites will be bereaved because of their rejection 
of God. This does not, however, make discerning divine speech an 
easy task; it still remains to interpret the essence of appropriated 
discourse. All this assumes that there is an essence to the passage; 
it requires authorial-discourse interpretation. Many contemporary 
hermeneutic philosophers, most notably Derrida and Ricoeur, have 
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argued against just such a possibility. Wolterstorff devotes two 
chapters to a defense of authorial-discourse interpretation against 
their criticisms. Against Derrida and Ricoeur, Wolterstorff argues 
that (1) since texts are the products of illocutionary acts, we can 
practice authorial-discourse interpretation by discerning the author's 
illocutionary stance (p. 149), and (2) Derrida's arguments against 
authorial-discourse interpretation rely on his unsupported and per-
haps incoherent rejection of metaphysics (pp. 164-9). 
Wolterstorff also prefers the appropriative model on the grounds 
that the Apostles and the Gospel writers are not described as speak-
ing in God's name (p. 53). In any case, there is no real conflict 
between the two. Perhaps, as Wolterstorff suggests (p. 187), some 
of the prophetic writings are indeed handled better by the deputiz-
ing model. There is no need to proclaim the two models inconsis-
tent, though presumably the text as a whole must be considered 
divine discourse by appropriation. 
Wolterstorff has now led us to the way in which we should 
think about divine discourse: God speaks through appropriating 
the essence of scriptural writings. On the traditional view, God is 
often said to speak through scripture, but this speaking has been 
meant in a metaphorical sense; Wolterstorff's analysis allows God 
to literally speak through scripture. God doesn't inspire scripture, 
rather, God appropriates scripture as his own (or perhaps God does 
both). One advantage this view has for religious believers is that it 
simultaneously allows us to view scripture as fallible while not 
threatening its divine authority. 
Scripture, however, does not wear divine discourse on its face. 
In order to discover divine discourse, we need to interpret scrip-
ture as a whole (pp. 204-6). Just like with human discoursers, we 
cannot accurately capture what is being said unless we view scrip-
ture as a whole. For Wolterstorff, interpreting scripture for divine 
discourse is not fundamentally different from interpreting human 
discourse. In order to interpret scripture correctly, we must make 
some assumptions about God and about what God would say (p. 
206). We have seen an example of this earlier, in the passage from 
Hosea. We cannot attribute the claim that God hates the Ephraimites 
to God in any literal sense; such an interpretation runs counter to 
the idea of God as a perfectly loving being. Thus, we must look for 
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the aforementioned essence of the Hosea passage. What we ought 
to accept as the content of divine discourse depends on what we 
believe God would say, given God's nature. We must also interpret 
scripture for divine discourse in light of God's purposes in speak-
ing to us (pp. 207-8, see also p. 224). Presumably, God's purpose 
in speaking to us is to bring us into a loving relationship with God; 
to reconcile us with God. No interpretation of scripture that is con-
trary to such a purpose could truly be the content of divine dis-
course. We should also note that the intended message of the hu-
man author may differ from God's appropriated message (pp. 209-
11) and that God's discourse, like our own, may carry multiple 
meanings (p. 216). 
But this raises a serious worry for Wolterstorff. If we must 
interpret scripture based on our beliefs about God, scripture threat-
ens to become a "wax nose", able to be molded and shaped how-
ever we so choose; where "interpreting for divine discourse is di-
rectly at the mercy of the vagaries of human bel ief (p. 226). It is 
always possible to revise our beliefs about God, or about other 
things, such that we can declare our interpretation the correct one. 
Take again the passage from Hosea. One can always modify one's 
beliefs about love and morality such that the entire passage can be 
read literally and declared divine discourse. Interpretation, 
Wolterstorff notes, raises the dual menacing possibility of (1) scrip-
ture being interpreted in such a way as to reinforce our already 
extant beliefs, and (2) missing what God has really said because of 
our own inaccurate beliefs (pp. 226-7). While Wolterstorff does 
think that there are ways to minimize "wax-noseishness" (pp. 236-
9), he does not believe that the dual menace is completely eliminable 
(p. 236). Nearly 1/3 of the book is devoted to issues of scriptural 
interpretation for the purpose of discerning divine discourse, mak-
ing it clear just how concerned Wolterstorff is with the wax nose 
problem. 
What for me was the most interesting part of the book were the 
last two chapters, which deal more directly with religious episte-
mology. They were also, unsurprisingly, the parts of the book I 
found the least convincing. In Chapter 15, "Are We Entitled?", 
Wolterstorff addresses the question of whether we are ever entitled 
to believe that God is speaking to us. He alleges that we are. 
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Wolterstorff s defense of this claim has its roots in his adherence 
to reformed epistemology. According to the reformed epistemolo-
gists (besides Wolterstorff, notable adherents include Plantinga, 
Audi, and Alston), religious belief can be properly basic; that is, 
justified solely on the basis on non-propositional evidence. (Al-
though they claim that religious belief w properly basic, their argu-
ments only support the weaker claim that it can be; and in any case 
the claim that religious belief is properly basic appears presuppose 
that the religious beliefs in question are true—at least I get this 
impression from Plantinga's early work—and thus begs the ques-
tion against the atheist.) Reformed epistemology is opposed to 
evidentialism, the view championed by Locke and Hume that the 
strength with which one's belief is held ought to be proportional to 
the support lent to it by the overall evidence. I wish to note here 
that it is unclear how it is that reformed epistemology and 
evidentialism are opposed; as stated, one could consistently hold 
both—the reformed epistemologist, to the best of my knowledge, 
need not commit himself to a denial of evidentialism, but rather 
only to traditional forms of foundationalism. But, for purposes of 
exposition, I'll allow Wolterstorff his opposition. Reformed epis-
temology is also opposed to foundationalism about justification, 
though they differ amongst themselves as to what theory of justifi-
cation they hold to. Alston, for example, is one of the developers 
of reliabilism, which Plantinga is critical of (though his own theory 
is similar in many respects); and Wolterstorff's earlier book, Rea-
son within the Limits of Religion seems at times to advocate 
coherentism. In Divine Discourse, Wolterstorff appears to be speak-
ing from the "proper function" position advocated by Plantinga. 
While clearly from within the fold of reformed epistemology, Di-
vine Discourse presents some modifications to the view which in 
many cases constitute a backing off from reformed epistemology. 
For one, Wolterstorff does not appear recalcitrant about talk of 
epistemic obligations, the very thing found so distasteful about 
evidentialism. However, for Wolterstorff, what we are epistemically 
obligated to are not (as in evidentialism) degrees of evidential sup-
port, but rather doxastic practices (p. 271). Which doxastic prac-
tices we are obligated to depends, Wolterstorff claims, on our other 
obligations (pp. 272-3). Beyond this it is not entirely clear what 
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Wolterstorff s argument is. He appears to argue that so long as one 
is entitled to hold one's religious belief-system, one is entitled to 
believe that certain experiences are God's illocutionary acts. So 
long as one is warranted in one's theistic belief, one is obligated to 
doxastic practices which warrant belief that God speaks. Speaking 
about a specific case, he says: 
Let's assume that Virginia was entitled to her 
framework of basic Christian belief. I know, of 
course, that some will contest that assumption. But 
in considering issues of entitlement, one always 
has to take for granted that a great many—indeed, 
most—of the person's beliefs are entitled beliefs; 
otherwise we can't even get going on determina-
tion of entitlement, (p. 276) 
It is significant that when discussing whether we are ever war-
ranted (or entitled, to use Wolterstorff s terminology) in believing 
that God has spoken, Wolterstorff immediately retreats back to the 
issue of whether Christian belief is warranted. Presumably, so long 
as one is entitled to one's Christian (or Jewish, or Muslim) belief-
system, one is entitled to believe that certain experiences consti-
tute God speaking. Wolterstorff notes that some will "contest that 
assumption"; I am one. Supposing that Wolterstorff is right, in or-
der to decide whether we are warranted in believing that God does 
speak, we must determine whether Christian (etc.) belief is war-
ranted. Wolterstorff notes, in a Davidsonian vein, that we must as-
sume that most beliefs others have are warranted. But even if we 
grant this point, this is not itself a reason for thinking that others 
are warranted in their Christian (etc.) belief. I can surely grant that 
Christians are entitled to most of their beliefs and consistently deny 
that they are entitled to their Christian beliefs. To truly support our 
entitlement to believe that certain events constitute God speaking, 
Wolterstorff would need to do one of two things. First, he could 
argue that Christian (etc.) belief is warranted. Second, he could 
attempt to support his claim that God speaks independently. 
Wolterstorff does make some motions toward the second route. At 
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one point (pp. 275-6), he seems to be advocating an abductive ar-
gument—that God has spoken is the (or is part of) the best expla-
nation for a certain experience. This, I think, constitutes a step in 
the right direction, though it is a direction that points away from 
reformed epistemology. He appears to be allowing in explanatory 
considerations, the exclusion of which in the past has prevented 
any satisfactory response by reformed epistemologists to the Great 
Pumpkin objection. The problem is that allowing explanatory con-
siderations into the picture may cut out the heart of reformed epis-
temology. It is not clear that one can have it both ways. If the claim 
that God speaks relies for its warrant on antecedent warranted Chris-
tian belief, then no abductive argument of the type Wolterstorff 
hints at can get off the ground—appeal to God's speech would 
become question-begging. On the other hand, to give the abductive 
argument its due seems to require an abandonment of reformed 
epistemology. Thus, while Wolterstorff intends to explicate a non-
evidentialist epistemology of religious belief grounded in divine 
discourse (p. 15), he has not, in my opinion, done so. When push 
comes to shove, it appears that it is rather the other way around— 
divine discourse is grounded in the non-evidential ist epistemol-
ogy; and what independent support he hints at for divine discourse 
does not look to be non-evidentialist at all. 
Wolterstorff gives one last shot at it in the Afterword. There, 
he attempts to argue that we are justified in taking the Bible to be 
divine discourse. After rejecting Calvin's "secret testimony of the 
spirit" justification (pp. 286-7), he goes on to provide his own ar-
gument. The problem is that his own argument isn't any better. 
Wolterstorff argues that it is the apostolic tradition which justifies 
reading the Bible as divine discourse. Wolterstorff has, I fear, re-
treated back into a position where he is preaching to the converted. 
His argument will convince no one of the divine authority of the 
Bible (specifically the New Testament) who is not already con-
vinced; the support for his conclusion is as controversial as the 
conclusion itself. This problem is indicative of a lack of concern 
for issues of religious pluralism that permeates the entire book. 
Given Wolterstorff's adherence to reformed epistemology, this la-
cuna is not surprising. And given Wolterstorff's claim that the wax 
nose problem, while reducible, is not eliminable, this lacuna is 
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unfortunate. The Great Pumpkin still lurks in the shadows, grin-
ning at us like a perverse Cheshire Cat. 
Before closing, I would like to proffer two suggestions for fur-
ther lines of research on the topic of divine discourse. First, divine 
discourse appears in this book primarily in the form of monologue; 
it would be interesting to see how Wolterstorff's view would treat 
divine dialogue. Second, the issue of whether God is obligated to 
speak, and if so what the specifics of this obligation are, is worth 
pursuing. This project has the potential of going some way toward 
resolving the problem of divine hiding. 
The strengths of Divine Discourse are many. Wolterstorff does 
an excellent job of discarding the traditional view and bringing 
divine discourse into its rightful role as an important topic in reli-
gious thought. Wolterstorff has, I think, made a very convincing 
case that theistic believers ought to accept divine discourse. The 
book's weaknesses, though significant, are few. My main com-
plaints are that it pays insufficient attention to religious pluralism 
and has little to say that would convince the non-believer. What 
argument there is for theism from the phenomenon of (alleged) 
divine discourse runs counter to Wolterstorff's adherence to re-
formed epistemology. He does, however, manage to raise a serious 
issue that theists and atheists alike need to take seriously. 
